Considerations in Utilizing Digital Contact Tracing to Combat the Next Pandemic
I. Utilizing Digital Contact Tracing to Combat the Next Pandemic
The deadly COVID-19 outbreak that started in Wuhan, China has brought about years of change in the adoption of digital technologies in just a few months’ time.[1] The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the true interconnectedness of nations in our integrated global economy, emphasizing the importance of both national and global cooperation.[2] During any infectious disease outbreak, digital technologies, such as leveraging artificial intelligence and extensive data collection, either of an individual’s physical location or health status, may be prove to be an invaluable resource to public health workers.[3] For instance, digital communication, such as social media platforms, have played a significant role in supporting citizens’ mental health by sustaining their relationships through extended periods of social distancing and isolation but have also become a battleground for competing narratives around the pandemic.[4] The lack of a comprehensive privacy regulation means users will be forced to rely on the “good will” of technology companies to avoid misusing their data, protecting their data, or violating their privacy.[5] This may prove challenging as some key drivers of such applications’ revenue model is generated by data collection, use and storage, thus, the reliance on a developed application pursuant to self-regulation alone is not sufficient to address such privacy concerns.[6]
A. Global Cooperation & Coordination
Although the main objective of utilizing digital contact tracing applications is clear, different countries have taken different approaches to develop, implement and use such applications.[7] Tracking the spread of the virus in real time is imperative for effective mitigation of the virus.[8] But, there is a significant divide among nations between a “privacy-first” approach and a “data-first approach. The privacy-first approach protects citizens’ data at the cost of extremely limited access for public health authorities and researchers. [9] Whereas, the “data-first” approach which stores large amounts of data which, while of immeasurable value to epidemiologists and other researchers, may significantly intrude upon citizens’ privacy.[10] The lack of comprehensive privacy protection creates risks of non-compliance or deliberate confusion from citizens who fear revealing private aspects of their lives – a factor greatly exacerbated by recent major scandals over online privacy and the illicit use of citizens’ digital information, which have heightened public consciousness of these issues and created significant new challenges for any collection of large-scale public data.[11] Digital contact tracing is still relatively new from a public health preparedness perspective. The lack of consensus around best practices for its implementation and for reassuring citizens of their privacy rights may have already impeded its capacity to contribute to this pandemic’s overall response, but it is not too late to change this narrative.[12]
B. Ethical Implications
The pandemic has created an unprecedented opportunity for governments to rationalize post-pandemic expansion of their surveillance and collection of data on citizens and noncitizens alike.[13] Thus, it is necessary to consider ethical needs before, during, and after implementing any sort of digital contact tracing.[14] According to the World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations, users of digital tools should participate only on a voluntary basis where written consent is provided first.[15] Additionally, the WHO suggests the development of such digital tools address privacy concerns through transparency regarding the disclose of personal data and its usage, especially where data is transmitted to third parties.[16] One obstacle with such apps is persuading citizens to install and use the application, especially given the level of awareness of privacy and personal data concerns.[17] Although countries such as China, India and Quatar have legally mandated the use of these applications, this is not realistic in most liberal democracies.[18] One argument for mandating it is to help save lives as public suspicion directed towards COVID-19 has become problematic.[19] If enough of the population refused to participate in app utilization or deliberately “obfuscate their movements, this could lead to an huge failure of public engagement and policy around the tracing system – one which also implies an ongoing problem with public data collection efforts of many types.”[20] On the other hand, where no such mandate exists, citizens who distrust public- or private-sector entities (i.e., technology companies, governments, health authorities, private sector outsourcing firms, etc.) involved with the application, may decide not to install the application, or to regularly disable it, in order to protect their own privacy.[21]
II. Conclusion
Once the current pandemic is over, lawmakers, public health experts, and information privacy advocates need to collectively address the issues discussed and balance privacy protection with public health concerns so that individuals can be better prepared for the next pandemic.[22] Digital technology, such as digital contact tracing applications, offer opportunities to strengthen contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 as well as future infectious disease outbreaks. Digital tools should be considered as a way to enhance traditional contact tracing rather than serve as a replacement. Moreover, the challenges this pandemic has presented to information privacy are not going away anytime soon, but rather will become larger and more complex.
Ethical issues surrounding privacy, security, transparency and accountability also need to be considered throughout the design and implementation of digital tools for contact tracing. Marginalized and disadvantaged groups will be more likely to be excluded, particularly in low- and middle-income settings. When considering whether to implement digital contact tracing technologies, governments as well as public health departments need to be aware of the benefits, technical limitations and trade-offs between privacy and public health effectiveness.[23] Additional research is also necessary to analyze the effectiveness of digital tools for contact tracing, as well as research on the feasibility and thresholds required for implementation at scale. Digital contact tracing can provide significant strides in public health preparedness and contact tracing, but it also comes with serious privacy concerns which need also to be addressed.
[1] Laura LaBerge., How COVID019 Has Pushed Companies Over the Technology Tipping Point- And Transformed business forever, (June 12, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/how-covid-19-has-pushed-companies-over-the-technology-tipping-point-and-transformed-business-forever#
[2] Clarisa Long, Privacy and Pandemics in Law in the Time of COVID-19, Katharina Pistor, Ed., Columbia Law School, (2020). https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/240/.
[3] Jalabneh, Rawan et. al., Use of Mobile Phone Apps For Contact Tracing to Control the COVID-19 Pandemic: A
Literature Review, (July 5, 2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3641961
[4] Fahey, Robert A. COVID-19, Digital Privacy, and the Social Limits on Data-Focused Public Health Responses. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0268401220310239 (Accessed Feb. 21, 2021)
[5] Shachar, Carmel. Protecting Privacy In Digital Contact Tracing For COVID-19: Avoiding A Regulatory Patchwork. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200515.190582/full/ (Accessed Feb. 25, 2021)
[6] ESSAY: Separating Fact From Fiction: The First Amendment Case for Addressing "Fake News" on Social Media, 46 Hastings Const.L.Q.1, 7
[7] Cho, H., Ippolito, D., & Yu, Y. W. (2020). Contact tracing mobile apps for COVID-19: Privacy considerations and related trade-offs. ArXiv, 2003, 11511. [Cs] http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11511.
[8] Ghose, Anindya and D Daniel Sokol, Unlocking Platform Technology to Combat Health Pandemics’ Yale Journal on Regulation (2020). https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/unlocking-platform-technology-to-combat-health-pandemics-by-anindya-ghose-and-d-daniel-sokol
[9] Fahey, Robert A. COVID-19, Digital Privacy, and the Social Limits on Data-Focused Public Health Responses. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0268401220310239 (Accessed Feb. 21, 2021)
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Selby, J. (2020). NHS start building second contact tracing app days after tests began on first. Inews.Co.Ukhttps://inews.co.uk/news/coronavirus-latest-nhs-build-second-covid-19-contact-tracing-app-with-apple-google-426092
[13] Clarisa Long, Privacy and Pandemics in Law in the Time of COVID-19, Katharina Pistor, Ed., Columbia Law School, (2020). https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/240/.
[14] Id.
[15] World Health Organization. Digital Tools For COVID-19 Contact Tracing.https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Contact_Tracing-Tools_Annex-2020.1 (Accessed Feb.2, 2021)
[16] Id.
[17] Mullin, E. (2020). Calling police investigations ‘contact tracing’ could block efforts to stop
Covid-19. Medium, https://onezero.medium.com/calling-police-investigationscontact-
tracing-could-block-efforts-to-stop-covid-19-349cdc27766e.
[18] O’Neill, P. H., Ryan-Mosley, T., & Johnson, B. (2020). A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them. MIT Technology Reviewhttps://www. technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-tracingtracker/.
[19] Fahey, Robert A. COVID-19, Digital Privacy, and the Social Limits on Data-Focused Public Health Responses. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0268401220310239 (Accessed Feb. 21, 2021)
[20] Id.
[21] Mullin, E. (2020). Calling police investigations ‘contact tracing’ could block efforts to stop Covid-19. Mediumhttps://onezero.medium.com/calling-police-investigationscontact- tracing-could-block-efforts-to-stop-covid-19-349cdc27766e
[22] Clarisa Long, Privacy and Pandemics in Law in the Time of COVID-19, Katharina Pistor, Ed., Columbia Law School, (2020). https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/240/.
[23] Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19, CMAJ 2020. doi: 10.1503/cmaj.200922; early-released May 27, 2020, https://www.cmaj.ca/content/cmaj/early/2020/05/27/cmaj.200922.full.pdf
